Estimation of costs and benefits of debris mitigation by Boukabouy, Chaimaa





ESPINOSA ALEJOS, MARIA PAZ
ATECA AMESTOY, VICTORIA MARIA
EIRIZ, IGNACIO
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Master of Economics: Empirical applications and
policies
Department of Economic Analysis
University of the Basque country UPV/EHU
2020/21
Estimation of costs and benefits of debris mitigation
CHAIMAA BOUKABOUY
Master of Economics: Empirical applications and policies
Department of Economic Analysis
University of the Basque Country
2020/21
Abstract
Space debris is an ever escalating problem that is increasing the orbital scarcity and
threatening its sustainability. In this document, we present a model for the market of
satellite services where firms’ activity imposes an external cost on other firms due to
the risk of collision and debris accumulation. We evaluate the equilibrium outcomes
depending on the number of competitors, which affects the probability of collision.
Extensions of the model include the consideration of different types of satellites in
terms of weight and purpose. Our model suggests policy recommendations for the
outer space debris and how a possible fiscal policy can promote debris mitigation in
LEO (Low Earth Orbit).
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Space debris, objects that are no longer in use or function in the Earth orbit, rep-
resents a serious risk to spacecrafts and new mission satellites and potentially an
environmental problem due to the emission of pollutants. It is a negative external-
ity generated by launchers and damaged satellites which is already challenging the
sustainability of human activity in the outer space. While at the onset of space
activity the resources seemed to be unlimited, nowadays the access to the limited
geo-stationary (GEO) and low (LEO) orbital slots is rival and face the tragedy of the
commons, as current regulation cannot implement rigid systems of exclusion.
According to a study presented in April 2021 at the 8th European Conference on
Space Debris, the problem has been underestimated, and the amount of space junk
in orbit could, in a worst-case scenario, grow 50-fold by 2100. The number of debris
objects estimated by statistical models to be in orbit (as of January 2021) is: 34,000
objects greater than 10 cm, 900,000 objects from 1 cm to 10 cm and 128 million
objects from 1 mm to 1 cm (European Space Agency).
Debris accumulation has a multiplicative effect, the more collision fragments there
are, the more collisions will occur, with the risk that the entire population be reduced
to subcritical sizes. If the amount of space debris follows the tendency of recent years,
eventually it will reach a tipping point, known as the Kessler syndrome, that would
prevent any space activity.
The current economic cost of space debris is multidimensional, in the sense that it
currently generates economic losses when incidents occur, thus hampering the normal
functioning of satellites and, at the same time, it may further impede the develop-
ment of new opportunities if a critical level of congestion is reached or if the capacity
of orbits decreases. Our approach to this problem is to empirically approximate the
cost of space debris when launching a satellite and test the possibilities for policy
intervention. We build a model to analyze the impact of increasing space activity,
estimate the parameters of the model and obtain the external costs imposed by space
activity and the benefits of space debris mitigation.
So far, the contribution of economic analysis to the understanding of the problem
has been qualified as rather ”thin” (Grzelka and Wagner, 2019). However, the con-
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tribution of economic analysis can bring new interesting insights. For instance, the
modelling of strategic interaction between different firms that compete for a limited
space but do not fully (or not even partially) account for the negative effects of their
actions appears to be an adequate framework to study the outcomes in terms of space
debris generation under different market structures. This is the approach that we fol-
low in this contribution. There are some characteristics of the so-called New Space
Economy that we explicitly consider. The first one is the consideration of a growing
number of agents competing in this market; while the satellite operation and services
is not the most concentrated subsector of the space commercial activity, it is still far
from being a competitive market (Giannopapa et al., 2018). The second one is the
evolution through time of the mass of space objects and the coexistence of bigger
objects with constellations of smaller ones (Diserens et al, 2020). The third one is
the joint consideration of the direct effect of space debris (in terms of expected cost
of collision) and the indirect effect (in terms of the limit to the capacity of orbits to
host operating satellites).
First we present our theoretical model and the derived results. The predictions of
the model are to be tested using the evidence derived from multiple datasources. We
collect data on the estimated costs of different technologies that are currently under
development. Using that information, simulations will be conducted.
1.2 Methods
We first present a theoretical framework to emphasize the importance of the increasing
number of players in the satellite services market. The model provides an evaluation
of the external costs imposed by each firm on the rest of the market in the absence of
any intervention. These external costs depend on the market structure. We calibrate
the model using values taken from the literature to highlight the importance of the
different market structures.
We use data on space satellite activity to estimate the parameters of the model and
the external effects. Then, we will test some hypothetical policy interventions that
can help to reduce the new generation of mission related debris.
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1.2.1 Model
Table 1 below summarizes our notation and provides the probabilities of the different
collision events.
Table 1.1: The Main Variables
Variable Name
π Profit by period of one satellite
Π Profit of satellite owner
C Cost of one satellite
N Number of active satellites
Nj Number of active satellites of firm j
T Satellite lifetime in years
p Probability of destruction of a satellite due to collision
(1 − p)N Probability that no satellite is destroyed
p(1 − p)N−1 Probability that exactly one satellite is destroyed
...
pN−1(1 − p) Probability that exactly N-1 satellites are destroyed
pN Probability that N satellites are destroyed
In this model, part of the cost of space debris is the expected cost of replacing the
damaged spacecraft or satellite (direct effect). A second (indirect) effect of space
debris is that it affects the optimal number of operating satellites. First, as a bench-
mark, we assume that all the satellite services are provided by a monopolist. Later
on we analyze the more realistic case of several actors in the satellite industry.
When there is only one firm, its decision is to launch an optimal number of satellites
N∗. This decision takes into account the effect on the probability of collision, which
is increasing with the number of satellites in orbit. Once the optimal level N∗ is
determined, the firm will maintain it, even in the case of collision. This implies that
when a satellite is destroyed, it will be replaced so that the number of operating
satellites is always at the optimal level.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the profits that a satellite can generate are
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a decreasing linear function of the number of them, that is:
π = a− bN (1.1)
In other words, an increasing space activity makes each additional satellite less prof-
itable since the more profitable activities are undertaken first. To simplify calcula-
tions, we assume that satellites have an infinite lifespan and can only be destroyed
by collision.
In the case of a single provider of satellite services, the firm’s expected profits may
be written as:
Π = DπN − CN −DCρ(N) (1.2)
where D is δ
1−δ and δ is the discount factor; π, N and C are defined in Table 1.1; ρ(N)
is the expected number of spacecraft that are damaged by collision each period and
have to be replaced. Cρ(N) represents the expected cost of replacement per period.
In this setup ρ(N) can be expressed as a function of the probability of collision p and





Note that as N tends to infinity, then p(N) tend to one and 1 − p(N) tends to zero.
Therefore, ρ(N) tends to N . We assume that δπ < C in order to have negative profits
from launching a satellite that almost surely will collide. Thus, the expected profits









jp(N)j(1 − p(N))N−j (1.3)
The first term represents the revenues from satellite activity of N active satellites; the
second term is the cost of construction and launching and the third is the expected
cost of replacement in case of collision.
In the case of a single satellite services provider there are no external cost, since
the impact on the probability of collision of the number of satellites launched is
internalized. We analyze in the next section the case of multiple providers, where
each firm does not fully internalize the effect of its activity on the probability of
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collision for other providers.






(a− 2bN − Cdρ(N)
dN
) − C = 0 (1.4)
The expression above implicitly characterizes the optimal number of satellites in the
case of a single provider, N∗. An increase of N produces more expected space debris
and consequently raises the probability of collision p as well as ρ(N).
For a single provider, its decision to launch a new satellite depends on space debris, as
it raises the probability of collision and therefore the expected number to be replaced
and eventually the expected profits from satellite activity.
In our empirical application, we use previous studies to define several scenarios con-
cerning the probability of collision as a function of satellite activity (Adilov et al
2015).
Competing providers of satellite services
After analyzing the case of a single provider, we consider a more competitive market
in this section, an oligopoly. To simplify the exposition, assume we have only two
providers A and B that choose simultaneously and independently the number of
satellites to launch. NA and NB represent the number of active satellites of each of
the two firms. The revenue per satellite will be as follows:
π = a− b(NA +NB) (1.5)








where N = NA +NB and ρ(N,NA) =
∑NA
j=1 j(p(N))



















(a− 2bN − Cdρ(N,NA)
dNA







(a− 2bN − Cdρ(N,NB)
dNB
) − C = 0 (1.9)
Equations (1.8) and (1.9) characterize the optimal number of active satellites that
would maximize the expected profits of the two providers A and B. Note that the
number of NA depends implicitly on NB so the decision of firm A of how many satel-
lites to launch depend on the number of satellites launched by firm B and viceversa
(N∗A is in function of N
∗
B).
This strategic interaction between providers comes, first, from the market of satellite
services and the fact that revenues from a satellite depend on the number of them
providing similar services and, second, from the externality generated by space debris.
The optimal number of satellites decreases with the probability of collision and that
probability is affected by the decisions of other providers.
An important difference with the case of a single provider is that in this case the
external effects are not fully internalized.
In our empirical application, we assume there are several providers and we consider
only commercial satellites.
A competitive market for satellite services
As the number of satellite services providers increases, the market becomes more
competitive. In this section, we analyze the case of firms that do not have a signifi-
cant market power. Each provider is small compared to the market and may have a
negligible impact on π, as well as on the probability of collision p.











Ni and ρ(p,Ni) =
∑Ni
j=1 j(p)
j(1−p)Ni−j. In this market structure each
firm considers π (revenue per satellite) fixed as well as the probability of collision p
in ρ(N,Ni), independent of its own decisions.
Thus, each firm decides Ni to maximize profits:
δ
1 − δ




where ρ′(p,Ni) is the derivative of ρ(p,Ni) with respect to Ni. The market equilibrium
conditions that characterize the optimal N∗ are:




p = p(N) (1.13)
where ρ′(p,N) is the derivative of ρ(N) =
∑N
j=1 jp
j(1−p)N−j with respect to N . The
first equation is the condition that demand equals supply and the second requires that
the fixed probability of collision considered by firms in their optimization problems
is consistent with the equilibrium number of active satellites N .
Note that in this case firms do not internalize the impact of their decisions on space
debris. The supply curve for satellite services is the marginal cost of the industry,
the right hand side of equation (1.12), and in this expression the derivative ρ′(p,N)
considers p as fixed. The fact that each provider i considers the probability of collision
p as fixed (independent of Ni) implies that there is not even a partial internalization.
Inefficiency and mitigation measures
In this section we first characterize the efficient solution and then propose measures
to implement it. We consider a perfectly competitive market; its equilibrium number
of satellites is given by equations (1.12) and (1.13) in the previous section.
The efficient solution corresponds to a level of N such that the social marginal cost
is equal to the social marginal value:





where ρ′(N) is the derivative of ρ(N) =
∑N
j=1 jp(N)
j(1 − p(N))N−j with respect to
N . In contrast with the equilibrium condition (1.12), here p is not a constant and
the marginal social cost takes into account the impact on the probability of collision
of new launches.
A fiscal policy could increase the firms’ marginal cost up to the level of the social
marginal cost, so that in equilibrium the number of satellites would be socially opti-




[ρ′(N) − ρ′(p,N)] (1.15)
would implement the optimal solution (1.14).
In this and the previous sections we have emphasized the external effects imposed on
other firms through the probability of collision and the need to replace the damaged
aircraft. However, note that if the probability of collision is high enough the space
economic activity may become unfeasible or unprofitable and the corresponding social
surplus would be lost. In the next section we focus on the social surplus that is lost
due to space debris.
1.2.2 Value of space activity
We compute the loss of total surplus due to space debris. We assume a competitive
market. In equilibrium total surplus is:∫ N∗
0




We compare this surplus with the total surplus that would be generated in the absence
of space debris and, therefore, a negligible probability of collision:∫ N∗∗
0
(a− bN − C) dN (1.17)
Where N∗∗ is the new equilibrium value (larger than N∗). Thus, the value of the
economic activity prevented by space debris is:∫ N∗∗
0
(a− bN − C) dN −
∫ N∗
0




Note that this expression contains the loss of surplus due to the loss of space activity
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(the difference between N∗∗ and N∗), as well as the increase of costs for the replace-
ment of the aircraft due to collision.
To estimate the economic impact of space activity, previous empirical studies have
based their valuation on four main indicators, job creation, GDP/GVA, government
revenues and spillover effects. Table 1.2 provides measures of impact.
It is estimated that each 1 euro investment made generate around:
Table 1.2: Estimated returns on 1 euro of investment
GDP Spillovers Employment Government revenues
1.9 1.9 2.3 N/A
Source: Euroconsult (2019)
Economic impact of space activity on employment
In our model space debris limits space activity to N∗, instead of N∗∗. The value of
the additional space activity translates also into lower employment.
Economic impact of space activity on GDP/GVA
In our model space debris limits space activity to N∗, instead of N∗∗. The value of
the additional space activity translates also into a lower GDP.
Spill-overs of space activity
Spillovers refer to impacts of space activity that are not captured by the GDP or
employment and include other indicators such as technology development, innova-
tion and data exploitation. The data generated is very valuable as it can be used
by scientist, commercial users, development agencies, and policy makers. Note that
the spillovers vary depending on the nature of satellites activities. In the case of
telecommunication satellites the spillover effect is different from the Earth Observa-
tion (EO), the downstream revenues are generated not by the data collected but from
the broadcasting and communication services, such as consumers access to internet
by satellites, communication with mobiles, governments communications and so on.
10
Economic impact of space activity on government revenues
Taxes related to satellites production and launching are also part of economic im-
pact, they can be direct government revenues through taxes on transactions, salaries
and consumption. For the Taxes, it is estimated that the contributing countries will
indirectly be recovering more than 60% of the overall cost of the programs.
According to a Euroconsult Socio-economic impact assessment of selected ESA pro-
grams report, a generation of €8 billion of government revenues (taxes) is estimated
over the full period of analysis (2007-2032) and in the economies of ESA 22 Member
States, plus Canada and Slovenia
1.2.3 Calibration of the model
The below graph represents the evolution of the satellites by HHI Index (for Market
concentration). The volume of satellites since the first spacecraft launch (Sputnik
in 1957) escalated from around 1 satellites launch per year to up to 70–90 launches
a year, an increasing number of launches injecting 30 or more small satellites into
orbit at once (ESA). This higher launch cadence and the decrease of manufacturing
cost in the past couple decades affected the concentration of the market, it is far
more competitive with less entry barriers (a rise in the number of businesses, SMEs,
start-ups and incubators) and thus the decline illustrated below:
The concentration by orbit type represented by the following graphs, as illustrated in
the graph the last couple years in all orbits we can see a higher concentration, this
goes back to the decrease of launch rate across all orbits types.
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Figure 1.1: Number of satellites and concentration over the years
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(a) Elliptical Orbit (b) GEO Orbit
(c) LEO Orbit (d) MEO Orbit
Figure 1.2: Concentration index by orbit type
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1.3 Data and Empirical results
The Data represent general information regarding the satellites that have been launched
in the past 40 years available from Space-track (US Air Force), European Space
Agency and NASA. It includes more than 3300 satellite launched since 1974 and are
described by 200 variables.
The table below represents the relevant variables and a brief description:
Table 1.3: Description of variables
Variable Label Descritpion
Name of satellites Name
Country of origin Country
Users The type of users of the satellite (Civil, Military..)
Purpose Nature of activity (Surveillance, Communication)
Type of orbit Polar, Equatorial or Elliptical
Class of orbit Low, Medium or Geostationary
Date of launch The date of launching
Expected lifetime Lifespan of the satellite in years
Dry mass The mass of the rocket at full ascent (Kg)
Launch mass The mass of the launch vehicle upon takeoff (Kg)
Perigee The point in the orbit at which the satellite is nearest to the earth
Apogee The point at which the distance is greatest
Letters (AB, AC..) Describe the sources of the launching information
1.3.1 Estimating the probability of collision
Probability of Collision is one of the most main metrics at present for collision avoid-
ance measures, pc(N) incorporates different mathematical models which makes it


















The above equation represents the computational form of the probability based on
Alfano and Oltrogge paper (2018), this model is very sensitive to inputs (Object size,
shape and orientation) and therefore it is very crucial to determine the independent
variables as they can give erroneous results.
This Probability assumptions are:
• Motion of the conjunction objects is fast enough (to be considered linear).
• Errors are zero-mean, Gaussian and uncorrelated.
• Covariance (size, shape, orientation) is assumed constant
• Objects are modeled as spheres.
In our model we will be focusing on estimating pc(N) as a function of volume (kg)












with AR > 1
The AR is the covariance aspect ratio (shape), d is the miss distance (the maximum
distance at which the explosion of a missile head can be expected to damage a target,
dictionary of aviation copyright 2005). The graphs below show the estimated proba-
bility of collision for different shapes and sizes and distances based on the Alfano et
Oltrogge (2018) nomogram.
The distance graph illustrates how the least the distance between the objects the
higher the probability of collision, note that d represents the miss distance in km, for
the second graph to see the impact of the AR (shape) and the size (r) of the objects
on the probability of collision we fixed the distance at 1 km.
With the distance ceteris paribus, we can conclude that larger the size and the sizeable
the shape the more likely the objects to collide.
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(a) Probability of collision
by distance (km)
(b) Probability of collision
by size (m) (c) Probability by AR
Figure 1.3: Probability of Collision as a function of Distance, size and covariance
aspect ratio
1.3.2 Estimating the cost of replacement of damaged satel-
lites or aircraft
Based on the simulations and the test cases that were run by NASA using the Perfect
option 5. the collision probability between a cataloged space object and a launch ve-
hicle with a 200m radius is estimated around 1.93E-03 (newer computations estimate




jp(N)j(1 − p(N))N−j = 1
−4p+ 4p2 + 1
(1 − p)N − ppN−
p2(−p+ 1)N + p2pN −NppN + 2Np2pN
Replacing p(N) with it’s estimated value:
1.802 × 10−3 × 0.99N − 1.802 × 10−3 × 0.0017N − 1.796 × 10−3 × 0.0017NN
and the estimated p(N) and ρ(N) in the equilibrium conditions 1.4, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10 and




1.802 × 10−3 × 0.99N − 1.802 × 10−3 × 0.0017N − 1.796 × 10−3 × 0.0017NN
dN
The graph show the evolution of the cost of replacement by the number of satellites
launched across the years, at the early years we see a steady increase of the cost
of replacement due to the increase of satellites launched, the higher the number of
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Figure 1.4: Evolution of cost of replacement ρ(N) by number of satellites (N)
satellites the higher the probability of collision and thus the cost of replacement. on
the contrast, the years after 2019 have seen a decrease in the number of launches
comparing to the years before which explains the drop in the cost of replacement
(less probability of collision).
1.3.3 Mitigation measures
Mitigation measures play an essential role to preserve the outer space environment
and guarantee its sustainability since as demonstrated earlier, the debris present
a menace to new launch missions and the functioning of previous spacecrafts and
satellites, and to some extent a high risk to crew safety and also a hazard to earth in
case of atmospheric re-entry.
The debris mitigation measures can be summed in two main categories: near term
and long term. The short term involve the reduction of collisions and the generation
of debris related to new missions (avoidance manoeuvres and passivation), the long
term is based on de-orbitting and removing spacecrafts and launch vehicle that are
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no longer of use from very populated and operational orbits and the compliance of
guidelines. The united nations office for outer space affairs has developed a frame-
work structure (guidelines) that should be followed in the early stages of planning,
manufacturing, design and later on for the launching and the disposal. The guidelines
can be summarized in:
• Limitation of the space activity (Spacecrafts and launch vehicles) in the LEO
and GEO.
• Avoiding intentional destruction and minimizing post mission breakups (stored
energy)
• Limiting the debris released and collision in orbit (separation mechanisms and
deployment).
As of now The only used measures based on ESA’s data are the collision manoeuvres
and passivation. The collision manoeuvres vary depending on the orbit type of the
spacecraft, for the LEO per instance the only possible and recommended disposal is
the re-entry to earth atmosphere, while for other orbits the graveyarding technique
is the most effective up to now manoeuvre under which the space craft have to re-
orbit at an altitude no less than 300KM above the GEO ring to ensure that objects
cannot collude nor interfere. The passivation technique is implemented at the early
stages of the manufacturing (energy reservoirs), it consist of removing all form of
energy sources to avert explosions while in orbital stage. Such energy can be residual
propellants, fuel and the discharge of batteries.
Active Debris Removal
The active debris removal summarizes new concepts developed by space agencies to
clean space at a rate of 5 to 10 objects per year some of these concepts are (Based
on the International Interdisciplinary Space Debris Congress report, 2012) :
• Momentum exchange or electrodynamics (LEO only) tether
• Attaching a deboost motor
• a balloon (LEO only) or adding a device to the object to increase drag
• Deploying a reusable tug that grapples and moves
• Retrieval (return to earth, recycling in space) of the object
18
The main constraint when it comes to the ADR is that they should be cost effective.
Some of these ADR are estimated to start by 2060 (ESA) but it would be 26% less
effective than if used now.
Taxes
an Economic solution to the debris issue can be summarized in a tax schedule.
Few economist tried to model a taxation scheme for the outer space due to its partic-
ularity. Adilov et al (2015) found that perfect competition between firms results in a
level of satellite launches, that surpasses the social optimum and investment in debris
mitigation that is below the social optimum. The authors derived a two-part Pigou-
vian tax for that specific type of market context: The tax takes into consideration a
debris creation parameter and it is applied per launch. The authors also suggest that
the revenues can be used to finance new debris removal technologies.
On the other hand Macauley (2015) also prescribed a system of launch taxes focus-
ing more on LEO’s as they are more populated and have a higher volume of debris;
she matches the taxes (at launch) with refunds to companies that apply end-of life
disposal measures to their satellites and spacecrafts. Her approach includes rebated
taxes to satellite producers for incorporating certain ex ante debris mitigation tech-
nologies such as graveyarding, orbital manoeuvring and shielding and these measures
can also yield some spillover benefits.
Based on our model and the perfect competition setup we consider a tax per satellites






Space by definition is considered a public good, its market opportunities are related
to the exploitation and the exploration of outer space which can be represented by
data gathered, communication and navigation’s (each satellite provide a service). In
contrast the market failure arise from the externalities related to the use of the public
good (common property) such as Debris, resources allocations, the large fixed cost
related to space activity and manufacturing, under-investment situation and finally
the limit spill over effect that only few countries benefit from.
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The Space debris problem is threatening the sustainability of space and damaging the
environment, the availability of orbital sloth and bandwidths coverage has became
less and less attainable due to the exponential increase of launching rates, collisions
between debris or extant satellites creates additional debris. In the limiting case, col-
lusion cascading could reduce the realized value of certain earth orbits to zero. Many
scientist and space agencies are estimating more debris generation and ultimately a
non accessible outer space due to the higher probability of collision that increases
with every new launch mission.
The aim of this paper is to study the impact of increasing space activity (under dif-
ferent market structures: Monopoly, oligopoly and perfect competition) by valuating
the debris in outer space and its cost and then model a policy intervention that can
help reduce the new generation of mission related debris. We illustrated an approach
to quantify the cost of debris based of the firm profits and the probability of colli-
sion under the three market structures. Space debris is an externality generated by
expended launch vehicles and damaged satellites our model gave us in the case of a
single satellite services provider no external cost since the impact on the probability
of collision of the number of satellites launched is internalized, in contrast for the
perfect competition and oligopoly the firms respectively do not internalize the impact
of their decisions on space debris or they are not fully internalized. The internal-
ization of externalities related to space activity (or debris) can be represented by an
enforced liability (Todd sandler, Global collective action), the damages caused or the
debris based on the ”outer space treaty” is assigned (the liability) to the nation or
organisation responsible for the launching and operating. the more a nation has large
objects in orbit the less likely to internalize.
The previous debris mitigation measures implemented had a slight significance on
the rate of debris generation and removal, the particularity of the issue goes back
the fact that only guidelines in the design, manufacturing and launching needs to
be followed but the volume of debris from previous space activities needs to cleaned.
we argued that the more suitable economical approach would be a taxation system
(Pigouvian) of launch taxes (ex ante) that is expected to reduce debris per satellite
launched. This fiscal policy could increase the firms’ marginal cost up to the level
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